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Impacts
• This review examines the future of predictive surveillance for viruses that
might jump from animal hosts to infect humans. Canine parvoviruses as
well as H3N2 and H1N1 influenza viruses are discussed as exemplars that
suggest what to look for in anticipating viral species jumps.
• To answer the question of where to look for viral species jumps, prospects
for discovering emerging viruses among wildlife, bats, rodents, vectors and
occupationally exposed humans are discussed.
• The authors identify opportunities and obstacles to predict species jumps
using genetic and ecological data as well as suggestions for how to look for
species jumps.
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Summary
Zoonotic disease surveillance is typically triggered after animal pathogens have
already infected humans. Are there ways to identify high-risk viruses before
they emerge in humans? If so, then how and where can identifications be made
and by what methods? These were the fundamental questions driving a work-
shop to examine the future of predictive surveillance for viruses that might
jump from animals to infect humans. Virologists, ecologists and computational
biologists from academia, federal government and non-governmental organiza-
tions discussed opportunities as well as obstacles to the prediction of species
jumps using genetic and ecological data from viruses and their hosts, vectors
and reservoirs. This workshop marked an important first step towards envi-
sioning both scientific and organizational frameworks for this future capability.
Canine parvoviruses as well as seasonal H3N2 and pandemic H1N1 influenza
viruses are discussed as exemplars that suggest what to look for in anticipating
species jumps. To answer the question of where to look, prospects for discover-
ing emerging viruses among wildlife, bats, rodents, arthropod vectors and
occupationally exposed humans are discussed. Finally, opportunities and obsta-
cles are identified and accompanied by suggestions for how to look for species
jumps. Taken together, these findings constitute the beginnings of a conceptual
framework for achieving a virus surveillance capability that could predict future
species jumps.
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Introduction
Most emerging human diseases are zoonoses, which are
infections caused by pathogens of animal origin (Taylor
et al., 2001). Early detection of potentially high-risk
pathogens within animal hosts or vectors could enable
mitigation strategies to prevent a species jump to
humans, such as avoidance of high-risk areas, prophylac-
tic drug distribution or timely mobilization of surveil-
lance and medical resources to cope with emergent
disease. However, our understanding of host–pathogen
ecology and evolution is not yet sufficiently robust to
allow us to recognize the patterns, processes and mecha-
nisms that predicate species jumps. In the future, persis-
tent surveillance in animals could detect changes in
viruses that precede a species jump and allow mitigation
or prevention of human infections. The prospects for pre-
dicting infectious disease outbreaks have been reviewed
and discussed by several authors (Cleaveland et al., 2001;
Taylor et al., 2001; Childs, 2004; Wolfe et al., 2005;
Holmes and Drummond, 2007; Parrish et al., 2008;
Childs and Gordon, 2009; Pulliam and Dushoff, 2009;
Pepin et al., 2010). In this review, we outline a conceptual
framework for achieving a virus surveillance capability
that could predict future species jumps.
There are two distinct phenomena that result in human
infection by zoonotic viruses: spillover events and species
jumps. During a spillover event, humans become infected
with zoonotic viruses to which they are susceptible but
are rarely exposed and which do not efficiently transmit
from human to human. To make a species jump, animal
viruses undergo genetic changes that render them newly
able to spread efficiently among humans. Species-jumping
viruses may (or may not) have been able to cause spo-
radic human infections during spillover events. Con-
versely, viruses that have spilled over into human
populations may subsequently evolve (i.e. jump) to effi-
ciently transmit among human hosts (see Table 1 for his-
torical examples of each).
Most zoonotic surveillance efforts are reactive, collect-
ing incidence data from people who are already sick and
seeking animal sources of pathogens that have already
spread to humans. By contrast, predictive surveillance
efforts aim to identify ecological conditions (e.g. climate,
vegetation, land use) that precede animal and human out-
breaks and can provide timely warning to human popula-
tions (Ostfeld et al., 2005; Anyamba et al., 2009). Both
spillover events and species jumps have historically been
revealed by public health surveillance. A limited number
of surveillance efforts, such as those undertaken by the
Global Viral Forecasting Initiative and the EcoHealth Alli-
ance, attempt predictive surveillance for species jumps by
seeking underlying ecological drivers. Like the viruses they
target, predictive surveillance efforts are emergent, and
there are numerous obstacles, both technical and organi-
zational, that challenge their development.
Canine parvoviruses as well as seasonal H3N2 and
pandemic H1N1 influenza viruses are discussed below as
exemplars that suggest what to look for in anticipating
species jumps. To answer the question of where to look,
prospects for discovering emerging viruses among wild-
life, bats, rodents, arthropod vectors and occupationally
exposed humans are discussed. Finally, opportunities and
obstacles are identified and accompanied by suggestions
for how to look for species jumps. Taken together, these
findings constitute the beginnings of a conceptual frame-
work for achieving a virus surveillance capability that
could predict future species jumps.
What to Look For: Virus–Host Dynamics
H3N2 evolution
Seasonal H3N2 influenza viruses are capable of evading
immune recognition through continual antigenic drift of
their surface glycoproteins, hemagglutinin (HA) and
neuraminidase (NA), complicating long-term control of
the disease by vaccination. Despite high mutation rates,
the genetic diversity of HA is constrained. This limited
diversity is evident in HA phylogeny, which shows high
extinction rates that result partly from cross-immunity
between similar strains. That is, many HA mutants go
extinct because they fail to spread efficiently from host to
host because of immunity in previously infected individu-
als. Several hypotheses have been suggested to explain
how competition between closely related strains interacts
with other factors to limit the observed diversity of HA
and NA. One hypothesis suggests that short-term, strain-
transcending immunity may limit the growth and muta-
tion of influenza strains (Ferguson et al., 2003). Another
hypothesis is that punctuated antigenic changes in HA
may precipitate selective sweeps, allowing sufficiently
novel mutants to outcompete related strains of the same
subtype (Koelle et al., 2006). This process has been
termed ‘epochal evolution’, as the discovery of new anti-
genic phenotypes depends on periods of extensive geno-
typic change with generally minor but occasionally
dramatic effects on phenotype.
How are the patterns of seasonal influenza in humans
useful to predict species jumps? Understanding the
dynamics of influenza in human hosts sheds light on the
potential of the human population to be infected by new
strains, the probability that a spillover virus can acquire
evolutionary adaptations to facilitate spread in humans
and the abilities of intermediate hosts (such as chickens
and pigs) to generate pandemic viruses. Seasonal influ-
enza creates cycles of higher and lower immunity in
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humans: epidemics deplete susceptibles, leaving a higher
fraction of the population with protective immunity.
Some of this immunity has been shown to be cross-pro-
tective against viruses of other subtypes (e.g. infection
with seasonal influenza can confer partial protection to
infection with H5N1). In addition, the diversity of viruses
circulating in humans should in theory correlate with the
potential for an emerging virus to exchange gene seg-
ments with an adapted resident virus, which could
increase the emerging virus’s rate of transmission. Reas-
sortment events are commonly associated with seasonal
influenza and appear to be an integral evolutionary step
in pandemics. The generation of pandemic viruses
through reassortment depends sensitively on dynamics in
the intermediate host population, including the amount
of herd immunity in non-human hosts and the dynamics
of viral diversity in that host population. Compared to
humans, pig populations can contain a much greater
diversity of H3N2 viruses, including antigenic variants of
H3 HA that have long been extinct in the human popula-
tion (de Jong et al., 2007), but the rate of viral antigenic
evolution in pigs is slower. As with humans, an important
question is how host immunity, local climate, viral muta-
tion and birth/death processes affect the observed patterns
of influenza diversity. Understanding these basic processes
should allow the long-term effects of interventions (e.g.
culls, quarantines, antivirals and vaccinations) on viral
evolution to be predicted and shed light on which steps
(such as key mutations or contact rates between hosts)
(Cobey et al., 2010) limit emergence.
H1N1 jump from swine to humans
Data collected from the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic
may provide new insights into its tropism and virulence
mechanisms. Shortly after its detection in humans, the
2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza A virus (A/H1N1pan)
was determined by phylogenetic analysis to have arisen
from combinations of viruses that previously infected
human, swine and avian hosts (Dawood et al., 2009).
Subsequent animal studies revealed host-specific differ-
ences in virulence among A/H1N1pan strains – that is,
Table 1. Historical examples of spillover events [a] and species jumps [b]
Virus (species name) Animal hosts* Date Location Reference*
[a] Spillover events
Marburgvirus (Lake Victoria
marburgvirus)
Unknown 1967 Marburg and Frankfurt,
Germany
Martini, 1969;
Towner et al., 2009
Hantavirus (Sin Nombre virus) Deer mouse 1993 Four Corners area, US Centers for Disease
Control, Prevention.,
1993
Monkeypox (Monkeypox virus) Monkey, prairie dog,
African rodents, et al.
1970 Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Democratic Republic
of Congo
Anon. 1971
Human-adapted
virus
Animal-derived
virus
Animals with
confirmed
infections*
Date of first
detected human
outbreak/case Location Reference*
[b] Species jumps
SARS coronavirus SARS-like coronavirus Civet, raccoon
dog, bat§
2003 Multicountry (Viet Nam,
China, Singapore,
Thailand, Canada)
Anon, 2003, Li et al.,
2005; Guan et al.,
2003
HIV-1 SIVcpz (simian
immunodeficiency virus
chimpanzee)
Chimpanzee Before 1959– Leopoldville, Belgian
Congo (now Kinshasa,
Democratic Rep of Congo)
Zhu et al., 1998;
Korber et al., 2000;
Worobey et al., 2008
Influenza A subtype
pdmH1N1
Influenza A subtype H1N1 Pig 2009 Northern Mexico Anon, 2009
*The distinction between spillover events and species jumps can be blurry. Spillover events are defined here as incidental human outbreaks with-
out sustained human-human transmission; species jumps are driven by genetic changes that enable sustained human-human transmission. Viruses
that have spilled over into human populations may subsequently evolve (i.e. jump) to efficiently transmit among human hosts.
Marburg viral RNA and antiviral serum antibodies were detected in Egyptian fruit bats (Rousettus aegyptiacus) in Uganda (Towner et al., 2009).
While these outbreaks occurred in Germany, both were caused by exposure to the same lot of green monkeys (Chlorocebus sp, formerly genus
Cercopithecus) imported from Uganda.
§While infected animals have been detected in markets, they have not yet been detected in the wild.
–Two more recent studies have narrowed this estimate to 1915–1941 (Korber et al., 2000) and 1884–1923 (Worobey et al., 2008) using phyloge-
netic analyses.
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animal species (mice, ferrets, macaques) were affected dif-
ferently depending upon the strain with which they were
infected (Memoli et al., 2009). These pathotype variations
suggest that for a given A/H1N1pan strain, different spe-
cies are more or less susceptible to infection and/or
develop different immune responses that diminish or
worsen outcomes of infection, leading to species-specific
differences in morbidity and mortality. Despite fears,
A/H1N1pan has exhibited a global mortality rate of far
<1%, compared with an estimated 2.5% for 1918 pan-
demic influenza A virus (Taubenberger and Morens,
2006; Bautista et al., 2010). Smith et al. (2009), utilizing a
Bayesian molecular clock analysis of swine-origin influ-
enza virus (S-OIV) outbreak strains, estimated that the
A/H1N1pan common ancestor emerged between August
2008 and January 2009. Additional retrospective analyses
may help reveal how sentinel cases during this time frame
went unnoticed. The possibility that A/H1N1pan emerged
up to 8 months before detection illuminates the uncer-
tainties, opportunities and risks accompanying the current
zoonotic viral surveillance vacuum.
Parvovirus jump between cats, dogs and raccoons
Parvoviruses infect several carnivorous species, including
domestic dogs and cats as well as wild foxes, mink and
raccoons. While those viruses are not infectious to
humans, these viruses are known to have made a species
jump from cats to dogs and also to raccoons. Their small,
single-stranded DNA genomes (comprised of two genes
that encode four proteins) and widespread occurrence
among domestic and wild carnivores make the parvovi-
ruses particularly useful as models for understanding how
species jumps occur.
In the late 1970s, canine parvovirus (strain 2, CPV-2)
emerged as a new pathogen infecting dogs and spread
globally within the year (Hoelzer and Parrish, 2010). That
virus was clearly shown to be a descendant of a cat virus
(feline panleukopenia virus, FPV) that jumped from cats
to dogs within 5 years prior to its emergence. Since that
time, CPV-2 has continued to evolve, and in one of those
steps, it re-acquired the ability to infect cats while contin-
uing to evolve within its canine host. Phylogenetic analy-
ses reveal changes in amino acid residues on the surface
of the viral capsid proteins. Although those are single-
stranded DNA viruses, they show high levels of variation,
similar to those seen for RNA viruses. Parrish et al. have
shown that many of the genetic differences between CPV
and FPV associated with host range variation occur in
these capsid protein genes, resulting in a tropism shift
that enabled the species jump from cats to dogs. They
further characterized the viruses structurally and showed
that they differ in their antigenicity and exhibit species-
specific differences in attachment to the host cell receptor
(transferrin receptor type 1) (Harbison et al., 2009). In
case of the FPV-to-CPV jump, genotypic changes (likely
about five mutations) gave rise to the changes in the viral
capsid that enabled the new virus (CPV-2) to bind to the
transferrin receptor in the canine host.
However, further research to elucidate the genotype–
phenotype relationships for other viruses must be under-
taken to determine how to identify viruses with altered
host range properties. As many zoonotic viruses bind to
animal host receptors for which orthologous receptors
exist in humans, laboratory studies using pseudotyped
zoonotic viruses in human cell systems may reveal geno-
typic and phenotypic changes that enable tropism shifts.
Where to Look: Discovering Spatial Patterns
To develop a predictive capability for detecting species
jumps, it is important to consider not only what to look
for but also where to look. The preceding section uses
specific examples of species-jumping viruses to suggest
means by which viruses adapt to new host species. How-
ever, in these and other examples, the sources of any viral
samples collected for analysis are crucial for detecting
informative changes.
Wildlife reservoirs of viruses
Historical reviews (Taylor et al., 2001; Brown et al.,
2008a; Jones et al., 2008) of emerging infectious disease
(EID) events have shown that (i) most are of zoonotic
origin, (ii) among zoonotic EID events, most originated
in wildlife and (iii) an estimated 10–40 new human
viruses are expected to emerge by 2020. Jones et al.
(2008) found that ‘Wildlife host species richness [a mea-
sure of the geographic distribution of 4219 terrestrial
mammalian species] is a significant predictor for the
emergence of zoonotic EIDs with a wildlife origin’. When
plotted on a global map, the areas at greatest risk for zoo-
notic pathogen emergence (‘hotspots’) were the equatorial
tropics. (By contrast, the most intensive EID research and
surveillance efforts were concentrated in temperate zone
countries.) These investigators and others (Kuiken et al.,
2005) suggest that surveillance efforts can be rationally
focused both geographically and based on income. These
data were compiled before the emergence of A/H1N1pan
in 2009 in Mexico, but as more geolocated virus sample
information becomes available, biogeographic relation-
ships may be revealed and predictors identified.
Zoonotic surveillance efforts focused on hotspots, such
as those undertaken by investigators from the U.S. Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention (discussed below)
and the Global Virus Forecasting Initiative, offer evidence
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that such efforts provide information that makes predic-
tive surveillance feasible (Wolfe et al., 2005), including
discovery of a novel retrovirus in monkey and human
populations (Sintasath et al., 2009; Zheng et al., 2010).
The ability to make correlations between homologous
viruses transferred between proximal species will be fun-
damental to predict species jumps.
Bats and rodents
Of the more than four thousand known mammalian spe-
cies, 50% are rodents and 25% are bats. This rich spe-
cies diversity, plus other ecological traits (high population
densities and reproductive rates), suggests that surveil-
lance efforts focused on rodents and bats could offer high
value. Rodents are typically small and can be trapped in
large numbers for surveillance, and they are easier to han-
dle and less expensive to keep in laboratory settings than
large animals. The ability to study viral infections in ani-
mal hosts under controlled laboratory conditions is cen-
tral to understanding virus–host ecology at molecular and
organismal levels, including the duration and severity of
infection, immune response, tissue tropism and pathol-
ogy. Laboratory-induced infections can also clarify the
species that are true reservoirs among the various suscep-
tible host species.
As with other wildlife, importation of exotic rodents
can drive viral emergence. In 2003, a multistate US mon-
keypox outbreak was driven by exposure to prairie dogs
(Cynomys spp.), which were infected by exposure to
imported Gambian giant rats (Cricetomys spp.) (Centers
for Disease Control, Prevention., 2003). Also, one human
case was acquired from a rabbit that became infected
when exposed to a prairie dog in a veterinary setting. In
this case, rodents commercially captured in forested areas
of southern Ghana were the sources of the US outbreak,
and a 2010 study by the US CDC found that 53% of
nearby human residents had been previously exposed to
orthopox viruses (Reynolds et al., 2010). While the 2003
outbreak was likely a spillover event, surveillance efforts
focused on the international rodent pet trade may detect
such events and enable genotypic/phenotypic characteriza-
tion of viruses that jump among rodent species and to
humans and pets.
Arthropod vectors
Many viruses are transmitted to animals and humans
from arthropod vectors. West Nile, Chikungunya and
Yellow Fever viruses are examples of arthropod-borne
viruses that have jumped to new mosquito species. In
particular, flying insects can greatly expand viral access to
bird, wildlife and human hosts. While collecting samples
from wildlife is a resource-intensive endeavour, large
numbers of known arthropod vectors can be collected at
much lower cost, making virus surveillance in arthropods
an attractive goal. Furthermore, geographic information
system-based maps that layer environmental measure-
ments (temperature, precipitation, land use) and vector/
host distribution data can be used to inform rational
decisions about when and where surveillance samples
should be collected. This approach has been used to cor-
relate environmental factors with competent West Nile
virus vectors trapped in urban areas of the north-eastern
United States (Brown et al., 2008a,b). Assembling such
risk-based maps would concentrate surveillance efforts to
maximize impact and minimize cost. While detecting
genetic precursors to species jumps in sampled viruses is
a long-term goal for which underlying knowledge is lack-
ing, in the short-term, characterizing endemic viruses
transmitted by local arthropod vector populations would
provide baseline information required for future predic-
tion. Such knowledge can be used to assess risk to human
populations and drive mitigation strategies (e.g. vector
control strategies).
Occupational infections
There are occupations whose members are frequently
(and in some cases continually) exposed to zoonotic
viruses, including veterinarians, farmers, ranchers, tanners
and food processors. Immunity acquired among members
of this ‘front line’ group, whether through symptomatic
or asymptomatic infection, would alter the dynamics of
infection and the spread of zoonotic pathogens. Yet, there
are surprisingly few studies in the literature reporting the
patterns and mechanisms of exposure, including the con-
sequences for immunity among the occupationally
exposed.
For example, exposure to swine influenza has caused
elevated levels of anti-swine influenza antibody among
animal workers. Olsen et al. (2002) found higher seropos-
itivity to swine-adapted influenza viruses among swine
farm employees and their families than in people with no
swine contact. Myers et al. (2006) found that farm work-
ers, veterinarians and meat-processing workers all had
greatly elevated serum antibody levels for swine isolates of
H1N1 and H1N2, compared with controls. Extension of
serological surveys to other at-risk occupational groups
could help define a baseline frequency of spillover by
influenza and other zoonotic viruses.
How to Look: Envisioning a Path Forward
The following is a discussion of recurrent issues that pres-
ent both opportunities and obstacles to achieve a predic-
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tive virus surveillance capability, accompanied by sugges-
tions to leverage the opportunities and overcome the
obstacles.
Leveraging opportunities
While whole-genome sequence data may be ideal in the
long term for maximizing information about emerging or
re-emerging viruses, deep sequencing remains a relatively
expensive and time-consuming method. This is especially
true when considering the large number of samples that
sustained surveillance efforts require. Standardized PCR
assays are a quicker, less expensive alternative, but primer
sets may fail to capture mutant strains or new viruses.
MassTag PCR is a relatively quick and inexpensive tool
that has successfully identified novel pathogens, including
members of the parvovirus (Kapoor et al., 2010), rhinovi-
rus (Lamson et al., 2006) and arenavirus (Paweska et al.,
2009) families. The TIGER broadband pathogen detection
system was also extremely useful in identifying the
A/H1N1pan index case in the United States, which was
‘untypeable’ human influenza A by standard methods
(Metzgar et al., 2010). Whole viral genome sequencing
should expand as costs decrease and as host and vector
genomes continue to be assembled. Such data should pro-
vide insights into the genomic correlates of virus–host
dynamics. However, elucidating the mechanisms by which
species jumps occur will further require longitudinal stud-
ies and collection of genomic data over time. In the short
term, increased use of advanced PCR techniques (includ-
ing MassTag and TIGER) should improve surveillance for
zoonotic spillover events. In the long term, an open
access repository resource, into which practitioners could
deposit viral, vector or host sequence data, could be
hosted to facilitate in silico longitudinal analyses.
Deriving predictive value from genetic sequences will
require elucidation of the complex relationship between
genotype, phenotype, pathotype and ecotype (Pepin et al.,
2010). Over-reliance on genomic (versus phenotypic) stud-
ies will not enable prediction of which viruses will jump to
new host species. Even for well-characterized viruses like
HIV and influenza, it is currently challenging to determine
from sequence information alone whether a given viral
strain will be more or less virulent (or able to replicate) in a
given host. Understanding the relationship between geno-
type and phenotype is one of biology’s ‘grand challenges’ –
and its elucidation will require a combination of many dif-
ferent and diverse approaches (Pepin et al., 2010).
Overcoming obstacles
The ability to predict species jumps is presently limited
by organizational obstacles that hamper needed scientific
progress. Prediction requires inputs derived from many
disparate bioscience fields (virology, ecology, evolutionary
and computational biology, immunology, veterinary sci-
ence, wildlife biology, etc.) that have little history of col-
laboration or current impetus to do so. No single field
can accomplish the required research, obtain the desired
knowledge or develop actionable models on its own.
Transdisciplinary collaboration can push experts and
funding agencies outside their default zones and create
opportunities for progress. However, anecdotal evidence
suggests that practitioners in required fields like entomol-
ogy have steadily declined, while newer fields like model-
ling and informatics still have too few trainees.
Currently there is no single organization or group
whose mission is to achieve a future capability to predict
and prevent species jumps. Future prediction capability
relies on a foundation of basic science that currently
exists only in fragmented programs. At the same time,
there is a body of scientific experts interested in elucidat-
ing species jumps. New predictive biosurveillance supply/
demand architectures could achieve real progress in this
area. A transdisciplinary permanent working group could
encourage and promote orthogonal approaches to key
research questions, including: Can laboratory viral adap-
tation in animals or cell cultures be used to model species
jumps? What evolutionary drivers underlie species jumps
by wild-type viruses? What human host factors and poly-
morphisms ameliorate or exacerbate viral pathology?
‘Gap-filling’ research will yield synergistic benefits and
further progress in diverse fields ranging from vaccine
and drug development to microbial forensics to biosecuri-
ty policy. For example, holistic study of a simple virus–
host system across molecular, genetic, organismal and
population levels can yield insights into how viruses over-
come barriers across these levels to jump hosts. Canine
parvovirus infection of mammalian hosts is a candidate
system, with known molecular changes that resulted in
tropism shifts, sustained transmissions between animal
populations and species jumps.
Furthermore, data from basic laboratory studies can
support the discovery, development and testing of com-
putational models that fuse essential biological, ecological
and evolutionary phenomena. Multidisciplinary teams
should organize to curate data sets, build and validate
new models, improve extant models and most impor-
tantly, define data requirements for future predictive
models that could be used to drive new sample collection
requirements and algorithm improvements.
Finally, before species jumps can be predicted, sus-
tained animal surveillance systems must be in place in
geographies of potential emergence to support longitudi-
nal studies. This is a challenge in a world where countries
lack resources and the mandate and infrastructure for
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livestock and wildlife surveillance. To that end, current
spillover surveillance efforts could be leveraged. For
example, plans could be made to process and share cur-
rently collected virus samples with multidisciplinary teams
for longitudinal genomic analyses. To conduct predictive
surveillance in the long term, practitioners must lay the
groundwork for optimizing surveillance efforts in the
short term to include laboratory analyses that can detect
tropism shifts or other changes that may preclude species
jumps.
Conclusion
The species jump mechanisms, processes and dynamics
discussed here suggest that distinguishing causal predic-
tive signatures of species jump risk will be challenging.
They further suggest that biosurveillance systems tailored
to recognize salient changes in viral fitness for alternative
hosts could cue early warning of species jumps. The
emergence of A/H1N1pan in North America highlights
the uncertainties and challenges in predicting whether
spillover events can lead to species jumps – yet, under-
standing the sources of new viruses is critical to under-
standing how they emerged. The extant zoonotic viral
surveillance vacuum (Smith et al., 2009) relegates the
power of sequence and phylogeny-based analytics to the
reactive realm of outbreak reconstruction. There is an
urgent need for pervasive surveillance capability at nodes
of disease emergence. This surveillance regime could pro-
actively direct tools for disease characterization, response
and mitigation to flash points while localized outbreak
control is still possible.
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